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NOTES 
The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations 
and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation 
Albert L. Vreeland, II 
In Powell v. Alabama 1 and Gideon v. Wainwright, 2 the U.S. 
Supreme Court established the indigent criminal defendant's right to 
court-provided counsel. Powell first applied the right to be heard by 
court-sponsored counseP to the states in capital cases. Although sub-
sequent decisions defined and shifted the contours of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, 4 Gideon overruled intervening prece-
dent5 and announced the defendant's right to court-provided counsel 
in all felony prosecutions. Completing the argument begun in Powell, 
Gideon declared the right to counsel to be fundamental to a fair trial, 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 
Despite their rhetorical elegance and power, these decisions offered 
little guidance to the states on how to meet the constitutional mandate 
they announced. The fundamental character of the right to counsel 
entails more than mere formality; it necessarily requires the effective 
assistance of counsel in preparing and presenting a defense. 7 Since 
Powell, 8 the Court has spoken often and with great force to require the 
provision of counsel,9 but has stood silent on how and by whom coun-
sel should be provided. 10 
I. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
3. The Sixth Amendment provides simply that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI. 
4. Compare, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1972) (right to counsel in state court 
appeals of right) with Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to counsel in appeals as of 
grace). 
5. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (right to counsel in state court limited to special 
circumstances). 
6. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341. In Betts, the Court held that the right to counsel was not funda-
mental to a fair trial and therefore was not incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 316 U.S. at 471. Gideon overruled Betts, finding that the right to coun-
sel was fundamental to a fair trial, applicable to the states as an element of due process. 372 U.S. 
at 341. 
7. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
8. The Court in Powell stated: "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, oflittle avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." 287 U.S. at 68-69. 
9. See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 625 (1972). 
10. Although the Court has never expressed a preference as to how counsel should be pro-
vided, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell have expressed concern over the cost of 
626 
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Left to their own devices to meet the Sixth Amendment mandate, 
the states adopted variations on three delivery mechanisms to provide 
counsel to the indigent accused. 11 Many developed public defender 
systems in which staff attorneys employed by the state represent indi-
gent defendants. 12 Other states use a contract system in which private 
attorneys competitively bid to provide indigent representation for an 
annual fee, irrespective of the volume or complexity of the caseload.13 
Most indigent defense, however, is provided by court-appointed coun-
sel.14 Appointed on a case-by-case basis, these private attorneys are 
usually compensated under a statutory fee scheme allowing separate 
fixed hourly rates for in-court and out-of-court time, 15 subject to a 
maximum allowance.16 
Compensation provisions for court-appointed counsel vary widely 
among states, 17 and tend to be substantially less than the prevailing 
rates for privately retained attorneys. 18 The discrepancy between the 
private and statutory rates is exacerbated by provisions limiting com-
pensation to a maximum allowance19 ranging from $100 to $5000, 
with most states imposing a limitation on felony cases between $500 
and $1000.20 Because of these limitations, attorneys are not compen-
sated for services after a certain hour. For example, with a maximum 
expanding the right to counsel. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 56-61 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in result). 
11. SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDATE 
OF ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 201-308 (1976). This discussion omits reference to private defend-
ers, such as the Legal Aid Society of New York City, because of their financial and managerial 
independence from the state. 
12. Id. at 211-33. 
13. The contract bid system has undergone constitutional challenge analogous to that di-
rected at the appointed counsel system. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984). 
14. Sixty percent of the counties in a recent survey provided counsel through court appoint-
ments. ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DE-
FENSE SYSTEMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 10 (1986). Appointed counsel are also employed in 
tandem with defender systems when the public defender has a conflict of interest in representing 
multiple codefendants. Id. at 35. 
15. Seventy-five percent of the counties that use court-appointed counsel distinguish between 
time billed for court appearances and time spent for out-of-court preparation, compensating out-
of-court time at a lower hourly rate. Id. at 18-19. 
16. Forty percent of the counties that use court-appointed counsel limit compensation for 
court-appointed cases to a maximum fee in felony cases, and fifty percent limit compensation in 
misdemeanor cases. Id. at 19; see also infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
17. The rates of compensation range between $10 per hour and $65 per hour, with most 
counties paying $20-$30 per hour for out-of-court time and $30-$50 per hour for in-court time. 
SPANGENBERG, et al. supra note 14, at 19. 
18. One study has estimated that court appointed counsel are paid forty percent less than 
privately retained counsel. NATIONAL STUDY COMMN. ON DEFENSE SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR 
LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 267 (1976) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR 
LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS]. 
19. States differ as to whether the statutory maximum applies to all time spent on the case, or 
only to out-of-court preparation time. Compare ALA. CODE§ 15-12-2l(d) (1975 & Supp. 1990) 
with ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-lOB(b) (Michie 1987). 
20. SPANGENBERG et al., supra note 14, at 19. 
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of $1000 and an hourly rate of $20, an attorney would exhaust state 
compensation in fifty hours. Representation beyond the fiftieth hour 
would be rendered, if at all, at the expense of the attorney.21 
This scheme for compensating appointed counsel has obvious and 
dangerous implications for the indigent accused's right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Fee limitations not only create disincentives to 
provide representation beyond the last hour for which the attorney 
will be compensated, but also impose financial burdens that may limit 
the attorney's ability to render effective assistance. This Note will con-
sider these implications in the context of counsel appointed to defend 
an indigent accused of a capital crime.22 
This Note argues that fee limitations deprive indigent defendants 
of their right to effective assistance of counsel. Part I of this Note 
reviews state court decisions that address Sixth Amendment chal-
lenges to fee limitations, yet fail to address the broader concerns about 
the appointed counsel system. Part II considers the inherent disincen-
tives and burdens fee limitations impose on attorneys and suggests that 
the limits threaten the indigent accused's right to effective assistance of 
counsel. A comparison of the fee limitations and the time required to 
prepare and try a capital case reveals the gross inadequacy of statutory 
fee provisions. In Part III, this Note argues that, under the current 
system, the attorney's duty as an officer of the court and the pro bono 
obligation are improperly invoked in defense of the fee limitations. 
This Note concludes that the state should shoulder the burden of indi-
gent representation in capital litigation as an essential cost of the crim-
inal justice system. 
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE: THE FAILURE OF 
STATE COURTS To ADDRESS SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS 
Although thirty percent of the country's state jurisdictions com-
pensate appointed counsel under a statutory structure limited by a 
maximum fee, 23 few have directly addressed the adequacy of defense 
21. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. 
22. This Note frames the issue in terms of capital defense because of the heightened proce-
dural safeguards afforded the capital defendant and the extraordinary complexity and difficulty 
inherent in capital litigation. See infra note 145. The argument can easily be extended to non-
capital cases, but applies with more force in the present context. 
23. SPANGENBERG et al., supra note 14, at 19; see, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 15-12-2l(d) (1975 & 
Supp. 1990) ($1000 felony case; $1000 capital case, out-of-court time); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
92-108(b) (Michie 1987) ($350 felony; $1000 capital); D.C. CODE ANN.§ ll-2604(b)-(c) (1981) 
($1700 felony, with exception for extraordinary cases); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 925.036 (Harrison 
1991) ($3500 capital); HAW. REV. STAT. § 802-5(b)(l) (1988) ($3000 felony with exception); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, ~ l 13-3(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) ($1250 felony with exception); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 31.070(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) ($1000 all cases); Miss. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-15-17 (Supp. 1991) ($2000 capital); NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.125(2) (1987) ($2500 felony; 
$6000 capital); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-8(B) (Michie 1978) ($400 felony for work at the dis-
trict court level); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991) ($1200 felony; $2400 capital); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1271(West1986) ($500 all cases); s.c. CODE ANN.§ 17-3-50 (Law. 
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counsel subject to such limitations.24 Most litigation over fee limita-
tions has focused, not surprisingly, on the attorney's right to fair com-
pensation. Attorneys have mounted constitutional challenges on 
claims of uncompensated takings of property and denial of equal pro-
tection in violation the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and invol-
untary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.25 State 
courts have been largely unreceptive to attorney challenges, relying on 
the attorneys' ethical obligation to perform pro bono public service 
and their duty as officers of the court.26 Most courts which have con-
sidered the Sixth Amendment implications of fee maxima have also 
summarily dismissed the defendant's concerns on similar grounds. 27 
This Part reviews the reaction of state courts to Sixth Amendment 
challenges to fee limitations. Section I.A discusses the seminal case, 
State v. Rush, 28 which rejected a Sixth Amendment challenge. Section 
I.B then summarizes Makemson v. Martin County, 29 the only case to 
squarely recognize a Sixth Amendment violation in this context. Sec-
tion I.C reviews a range of state cases that granted sparing relief on the 
basis of fairness to the attorney. Section I.D offers possible explana-
Co-op. 1985) ($500 felony; $750 capital). Some states allow counties to establish maximum 
guidelines. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-5 (Michie 1990). Others allow the courts to set 
fee schedules. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(A) (1989) (court sets fee schedule 
and county pays attorney); ME. R. CRIM. P. 44(c) (reasonable compensation set by court). 
Although some states provide that compensation in excess of the maximum may be awarded 
in extraordinary cases, courts rarely exercise their discretion. Robert M. Cipes & Philip H. Pen-
nypacker, Assignment of Counsel in State Courts, in lA CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES 
§ 14.10[4] (1990). 
The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1988), provides a similar scheme of com-
pensation for counsel appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants in federal court. The 
Act limits compensation to $3500 per felony, with an exception in the case of "extended or 
complex representation." 18 U.S.C. § 3()()6A(d)(2) & (3) (1988). Despite substantial litigation 
over the exception, federal judges have been extremely reluctant to grant excess compensation. 
Dallin H. Oakes, Obtaining Compensation and Defense Services Under the Federal Criminal Jus-
tice Act, in 1 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 7.08 (Steven W. Allen et al. eds., 1991); see 
also Criminal Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3233 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, 
and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
54 (1983) [hereinafter Criminal Justice Act: Hearings] (statement of Theodore J. Lidz} (under 
15% of applications for excess compensation approved). 
24. Those courts that have discussed the adequacy have limited themselves to an ad hoc 
review rather than a broad assessment of the system for providing indigent representation. See, 
e.g., Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 
(1987). But see State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 446-49 (N.J. 1966). 
25. See, e.g., Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982) (involuntary servitude 
and due process); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965) (due process}, cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); People v. Atkinson, 366 N.E.2d 94 (Ill App. Ct. 1977) (equal protec-
tion); Daines v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490 (Nev. 1976) (equal protection and due process). 
26. See, e.g., Williamson, 674 F.2d at 1215; Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635. But see DeLisio v. 
Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987) (ethical obligation did not override constitu-
tional right); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972} (same). 
27. See, e.g., Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1979); Resek v. State, 715 P.2d 1188 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986); State v. Allen, 611 P.2d 605 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). 
28. 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966). 
29. 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). 
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tions for the failure of states to face the Sixth Amendment challenge 
directly. 
A. State v. Rush: Ethics Over Economics 
In State v. Rush, 30 the Supreme Court of New Jersey established 
the precedent on which other courts have relied to dismiss constitu-
tional claims by indigent defendants and their attorneys.31 After re-
counting the attorney's common law duty to represent indigent 
defendants without compensation, 32 the court found that representa-
tion by uncompensated, appointed counsel was equivalent to represen-
tation by privately retained attorneys. 33 The court relied on the 
absence of empirical evidence to the contrary and on judicial notice 
that lawyers need only the incentive of their professional obligation.34 
To arrive at this conclusion, the court pursued two rationales. 
First, it dismissed the common criticism that the youth and inexperi-
ence of most appointed counsel impaired their ability to represent 
criminal defendants. 35 The court reasoned that young lawyers ap-
proached appointed cases with the same responsibility and zeal as did 
their more seasoned colleagues. 36 Lawyers of great repute, the ration-
ale proceeded, had little experience in criminal practice, owing to the 
lack of financial return in criminal cases.37 Nor did inexperience in 
30. 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966). 
31. Courts upholding maxima against Sixth Amendment attack have relied heavily on Rush. 
See, e.g., Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1979); People v. Atkinson, 366 N.E.2d 94, 99 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Okla. 1977). 
32. Rush, 217 A.2d at 443-44. 
33. 217 A.2d at 445. Other judges have saved no criticism for the quality of defense provided 
by appointed counsel. See, e.g .• Lots G. FORER, MONEY AND JusncE (1984); David L. 
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Bazelon, 
Defective Assistance]; David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 
811 (1976) [hereinafter Bazelon, Realities]; Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: 
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 227, 238 (1973); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not 
Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A. J. 435 (1963); Harold H. Greene, Introduction: 
Toward Realizing the Promise of Effective Representation in the District of Columbia, 12 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 781, 784 n.14 (1975); Robert S. Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested 
Solution, CASE & COM. July-Aug. 1969, at 3. 
34. The court stated that "(a] lawyer needs no motivation beyond his sense of duty and his 
pride." Rush, 217 A.2d at 444. 
35. For criticisms of the appointed counsel system's reliance on young, inexperienced law· 
yers, see U.S. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATlON 
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 30 (1963) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S RE· 
PORT]; AMERICAN BAR AssN., GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE SPEND· 
ING 15 (1982) [hereinafter GIDEON UNDONE]; Bazelon, Realities, supra note 33, at 812; 
Laurence A. Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense Serv-
ices, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 667, 684 (1975); Burger, supra note 33, at 238; Bruce J. Havighurst 
& Peter MacDougall, Note, Representation of Indigent Defendants in Federal Court, 16 HARV, 
L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1963). 
36. Rush, 217 A.2d at 444-45. 
37. 217 A.2d at 444. 
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criminal practice hamper an attorney's performance because, the court 
argued, lawyers can move easily between specialties. 38 Second, and 
more remarkably, the court found that most cases did not turn on the 
skill of the advocate, but simply depended on the facts and the applica-
ble law.39 To temper this bold suggestion, the court added that judges 
would assume responsibility for counsel serving by their appoint-
ment. 40 By denying the force of experience and discounting the im-
pact of the attorney on the outcome of the case, the court minimized 
the importance of effective representation and thereby obviated the 
need for adequate compensation. 
Although finding the uncompensated system free of constitutional 
defect, the court examined the system again under the light of policy 
considerations and measured the professional burden against a stan-
dard of fairness. The obligation to provide counsel to indigents rests 
with the state,41 the court held, and the court may compel attorneys to 
satisfy that burden as a condition of licensure to practice law.42 Con-
sidering the respective obligations of the court and the attorney, the 
court found that the criminal caseload had increased in size and com-
plexity such that the bar alone should not bear the burden of indigent 
representation.43 The conclusion arose not from a constitutional man-
date, but from a fair apportionment of the state's obligation among 
those required to carry it. 
38. 217 A.2d at 444-45. This statement may be dated by the nature of criminal practice at 
the time the case was tried. For the view that criminal practice is highly specialized and not 
easily entered, see Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 33, at 12. This is especially true of 
capital litigation, in which an evolving body of highly technical law prevents successful brief 
ambulations by counsel unfamiliar with the territory. 
39. The court advanced a contrary view in its later argument that defense is not merely 
presenting the defendant's version of the facts. 217 A.2d at 448. The court's assertion ignores 
the attorney's role in collecting and marshalling the facts and in researching and arguing the law. 
See Norman Lefstein, Keynote Address, 14 N.Y.U. R.Ev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 5, 7 (1986); Gary 
Goodpaster, The Adversary System: Advocacy and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, 14 N.Y.U. R.Ev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 65 (1986). The attorney performs a critical role 
in the sentencing phase of a capital trial where he must investigate and present mitigating evi-
dence from the defendant's entire life. Id. at 84; see infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text. 
40. 217 A.2d at 445. The court's assertion here is somewhat cryptic. The court does not 
suggest how this judicial responsibility will manifest itself, whether through the appointment of 
competent counsel only or through judicial supervision of the defense. The latter raises questions 
of the appropriate function of the judge and the independence of the defense. See Gary Good-
paster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 299, 359 (1983). The former runs contrary to judicial experience. Although a core of 
attorneys accept appointments in response to ethical imperative, the appointment system is rid-
dled with inexperienced and often incompetent counsel. See supra note 33. 
41. 217 A.2d at 446. 
42. 217 A.2d at 447. 
43. 217 A.2d at 448. The court did not completely relieve the bar's burden, suggesting that 
compensation at sixty percent of the prevailing rate would exact an appropriate contribution. 
632 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:626 
B. Makemson v. Martin County: The Reality of Compensation 
In Makemson v. Martin County, 44 the Supreme Court of Florida 
took a position contrary to the Rush court and held that a statutory 
fee maximum, although not facially unconstitutional,45 violated an in-
digent defendant's right to effective counsel when applied to cases of 
extraordinary circumstance. Finding the defendant's right to counsel 
"inextricably interlinked" with the attorney's right to fair compensa-
tion, 46 the court noted that the statute's token compensation endan-
gered the availability of effective counsel "in cases when it is needed 
most."47 The court grounded its finding on its inherent judicial au-
thority to effectuate all "things that are absolutely essential to the per-
formance of [the court's] judicial functions."48 The court therefore 
found that it had both the authority and the obligation to ensure that 
the accused's right to counsel was protected, an authority that in-
cluded ordering payment for legal services beyond that provided for 
by the legislature. 
Acknowledging that the allocation of funds may lie within the leg-
islative province, the court resolved the tension between the public 
treasury and an individual's right to counsel in favor of the individ-
ual's constitutional protection.49 The legislature's compensatory 
scheme controls the payment of appointed counsel, except when that 
scheme is so inadequate as to interfere with the accused's right to 
counsel. 50 The Florida court concluded that a statute allocating pub-
lic funds may not intrude on the inherent judicial authority to guaran-
tee a defendant effective representation.51 
The court further rejected a characterization of the statute as a 
form of court-imposed pro bona service. First, the court refused to 
dilute the defendant's right to counsel with the mere invocation of an 
attorney's common law duty.52 The pro bono obligation, the court 
44. 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). 
45. The court found that the appropriation of funds and determination of compensation was 
ordinarily within the province of the legislature and therefore the statute was facially constitu-
tional. 491 So. 2d at 1112. 
46. 491 So. 2d at 1112. 
47. 491 So. 2d at 1112. 
48. 491 So. 2d at 1113 (quoting Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978)). 
49. 491 So. 2d at 1113. Finding themselves without authority to appropriate public funds, 
other courts have refused to hear cases in which counsel is inadequately compensated or have 
refused to require counsel to accept appointments. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 
S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981) (en bane); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W. 294 (Ky. 1972); State ex rel. Partain 
v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314 (W.Va. 1976). Refusing to entertain prosecutions may prove to be an 
equally effective response, preventing the trial of an accused without adequate counsel and spur-
ring the legislature to appropriate sufficient funds in the face of a disabled criminal justice system. 
50. "At [this] point, the statute loses its usefulness as a guide to the trial judges in calculating 
compensation and becomes an oppressive limitation." Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1112. 
51. 491 So. 2d at 1112. 
52. 491 So. 2d at 1114. Although the court is not explicit here, the opinion may be read as a 
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argued, should not obscure the primary concern of indigent represen-
tation by shifting the focus from the rights of the accused to the duty 
of the attorney.53 Second, the court interpreted the Gideon mandate to 
place the burden of indigent representation upon the state rather than 
the bar.54 It found that the system of token compensation unfairly 
required a few attorneys, members of the criminal defense bar, to 
shoulder the burden of the state. 55 
The court reasoned that the growing complexity of litigation and 
the mounting costs of legal practice prevented attorneys from assum-
ing the cost of indigent defense. The court observed that the compen-
sation within the statutory limit was "insufficient to cover even 
overhead expenses during the proceeding,"56 and recognized the clear 
"link between compensation and quality of representation."57 The 
state court concluded that Florida's statute encroached on the court's 
inherent power to protect the defendant's right to effective counsel and 
therefore did not pass constitutional muster. 
Although the Makemson court predicated constitutional infirmity 
on the extraordinary circumstances of the individual case, a later Flor-
refusal to satisfy the right to counsel by invoking the pro bono duty of the attorney for fear the 
obligation may go unmet. 
53. 491 So. 2d at 1114. For a similar view that reference to the attorney's pro bono obliga-
tion confuses the defendant's right with the attorney's obligation, see Richard J. Wilson, Litiga-
tive Approaches to Enforcing the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 206 (1986). See also Benner, supra note 35, at 684. 
54. 491 So. 2d at 1114. The court noted that as a form of pro bona service, the statute 
operated in a haphazard and unfair manner. The unfairness owes to the bar's assumption of the 
state's burden. White v. Board of County Commrs., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989). The 
haphazard application derives from the small segment of the bar willing and qualified to accept 
criminal appointments. See LEE SILVERSfEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN 
AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 19 (1965). Those attorneys and 
firms most able to commit the time and resources may be the least receptive to criminal appoint-
ment. FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 110 S. Ct. 768, 772 (1990) (The large "up-
town" firm's response to the need for indigent representation was "feeble, reflecting their 
universal distaste for criminal law, their special aversion for compelled indigency representation, 
the near epidemic siege of self-doubt about their ability to handle cases in the field .... "). See 
Robert L. Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Strocture of Large Law Firms, 
1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 95, 114; see also In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 341 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(unfair for burden of indigent representation to fall on a small number of criminal defense attor-
neys); Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, supra note 23, at 25 (statement of Judge Thomas J. Mac-
Bride) (bulk of appointments fall on sole practitioners or small firms for whom the economic 
burden is greater); id. at 73 (statement of Brian P. Gettings) (burden of indigent representation 
falls on 5-10% of the bar). 
55. "[G]ood public conscience [does not] approve [ot] such shoddy, tawdry treatment of an 
attorney called upon by the courts to represent an indigent defendant in a capital case." Makem-
son, 491 So. 2d at 1114 (quoting Mackenzie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 
1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting)). 
56. 491 So. 2d at 1114. Florida's statute provides for $3500 for the trial of a capital case, 
more generous than most. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 925.036 (Harrison 1991). Testimony before the 
trial court, however, valued the attorney's services at $25,000. 491 So. 2d at 1111. 
57. 491 So. 2d at 1114. The court continued, "In our pecuniary culture the calibre of per-
sonal services rendered usually has a corresponding relationship to the compensation provided." 
491 So. 2d at 1114 (quoting Mackenzie, 288 So. 2d at 202 (Ervin, J., dissenting)). 
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ida decision suggested that the fee limitation would likely be unconsti-
tutional in all capital cases. 58 The court found that capital cases "by 
their very nature can be considered extraordinary and unusual and 
arguably justify an award in excess" of the fee maximum.59 The court 
declined to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face, 60 but framed 
its holding to suggest that any capital case that did not warrant an 
excess fee would be by definition extraordinary. 61 
Rush and Makemson defined the boundaries within which the 
Sixth Amendment battle over adequate compensation has been fought. 
Rush placed the duty of indigent representation on appointed counsel 
bound by their duty to the court, and discounted the importance of 
compensation, experience, and advocacy in criminal litigation. 
Makemson recognized the inherent power of the judiciary to protect 
the defendant's right to effective counsel, the state's responsibility to 
provide counsel to indigents, and the unavoidable link between fair 
compensation and the quality of representation. Although these two 
opinions stand in high relief, other states adopted less extreme posi-
tions, reviewing compensation on an ad hoc basis. None rely on em-
pirical assessments of the cost of a defense, 62 nor do they reach broad 
conclusions on the effectiveness of counsel in a system of 
undercompensation. 63 
C. The Response of Other Courts: A Middle Road 
A voiding the extremes of Rush and Makemson, other courts have 
followed a middle road, assessing the adequacy of funding relative to 
the hardship imposed on the attorney before the court. 64 One ap-
proach considers the impaired ability of a financially distraught attor-
ney to serve indigent clients. Another assesses the fair distribution of 
the indigent defense burden. 
Courts examining an individual attorney's financial hardship have 
58. White v. Board of County Commrs., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989). 
59. 537 So. 2d at 1378. 
60. 537 So. 2d at 1379. 
61. The court noted, "[W]e are hard pressed to find any capital case in which the circum· 
stances would not warrant an award of attorney's fees in excess of the current statutory fee cap 
[of $3500]." 537 So. 2d at 1378. 
62. This appears to be attributable to the failure of counsel to present such evidence to the 
court. See, e.g., Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 534 (Ala. 1979); Postma v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 439 
N.W.2d 179 (Iowa), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989). 
63. But see State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (W.Va. 1976) ("[W]e arc 
firmly convinced that there is more than adequate evidence that the burden imposed upon attor· 
neys of this State by virtue of the present system of appointment is rapidly approaching an unac-
ceptable and potentially unconstitutional state."). 
64. See, e.g., Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1977); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 219 
N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ill. 1966) ("[T]he court's inherent power to appoint counsel also necessarily 
includes the power to enter an appropriate order ensuring that counsel do not suffer an intolera-
ble sacrifice and burden .... "). 
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generally held that greater compensation may be ordered when the 
attorney's practice is burdened by undue financial strain. Unmoved by 
mere financial loss, these courts have required a strong showing of 
hardship approaching financial ruin. 65 Apparently reasoning that an 
attorney cannot provide the requisite representation when his practice 
faces financial devastation, the courts conclude that the standard 
should be a financial loss that would necessarily impair the attorney's 
ability to represent his clients. The courts have been hesitant, if not 
unwilling, to find ineffective representation where the attorney incurs 
personal costs that do not rise to catastrophic levels. 66 The question 
has been framed not as an inquiry into an attorney's actual or probable 
response to the financial constraints, but as a question of the attorney's 
hypothetical ability to render services. 
The "ruinous hardship" standard ignores the Makemson court's 
warning against emphasizing the duty of the attorney at the expense of 
the state's duty .to provide effective assistance of counsel. 67 These 
courts saddle the attorney with the burden of indigent representation 
in cases that do not threaten the attorney's livelihood. In doing so, 
they place unrelenting faith in the bar's ethical obligation of zealous 
representation and turn a blind eye to motivational implications and 
financial realities of compensation. These courts assume that an attor-
ney's ethical obligation will exact representation far beyond the serv-
ices remunerated by the state and that attorneys will not dispose of the 
case with haste to collect the nominal compensation.68 To the extent 
that these assumptions prove erroneous, these courts disregard the in-
digent's right to effective representation. 
Courts examining the appropriate burden borne by the state have 
eased the attorney's burden of representation, not under a constitu-
tional imperative, but on policy considerations of a fair distribution of 
the state's obligation to provide counsel to indigents. 69 These courts 
find the burden of representing indigents too great for the bar to bear 
alone because of the expanding right to counsel, the increasing crimi-
nal case load, and the growing complexity of criminal representa-
65. See, e.g., Bias, 568 P.2d at 1272 ("[W]here an appointed lawyer is able to maintain his 
regular practice ... statutory remuneration is constitutionally sufficient"); Randolph, 219 
N.E.2d at 340-41 (The maximum fee is "reasonable and appropriate where an appointed attor-
ney can continue to accommodate his regular practice and business and is not compelled to 
assume a staggering burden and sacrifice .... "). 
66. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of County Commrs., 451 P.2d 708 (Nev. 1969) (The loss of 
several clients, forced return of retainers, and inability to meet with other clients for over two 
months was insufficient to meet the financial ruin standard). 
67. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 1986); cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1043 (1987). 
68. But see infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 
1966); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314 (W.Va. 1976). 
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tion. 70 So finding, these courts defer to the legislature for the adoption 
of a less onerous system for providing counsel, 71 but none suggest that 
the bar should be relieved of its obligation completely.72 Under this 
approach, the focus again falls on the attorneys and their burden, 
rather than on the accused and their right to counsel. 
D. The Failure To Address Systemic Defects 
Much of the failure to recognize the threat to effective counsel re-
sults from the manner in which these cases arise. The Sixth Amend-
ment question reaches the court only after an attorney has devoted 
time far in excess of the statutory maximum, demonstrating that the 
indigent's defense was not compromised because of the limitation.73 
In both Rush and Makemson, the attorneys raised the challenge on 
their own behalf in collateral proceedings for compensation, not on 
behalf of the defendant in an appeal to overturn a conviction. 74 With 
effective representation rendered, a court could easily, albeit incor-
rectly, shift the focus from the defendant to the attorney, and deny 
excess compensation with an appeal to the attorney's professional and 
ethical obligations. 
A retrospective ruling on compensation poses no direct threat to 
prejudice an individual defendant's representation. The effect of deny-
ing compensation in an individual case, however, reaches beyond the 
individual accused by shaping attorneys' expectations of future com-
pensation. Postconviction challenges have fared no better, owing to 
the burdens and presumptions involved in proving ineffective repre-
sentation. 75 The last, largely unexplored, possibility involves applying 
for prospective relief before trial or in a civil suit raising a systemic 
challenge to the compensation statutes. 76 
70. Green, 470 S.W.2d at 573 (quoting Rush, 217 A.2d at 446); Oakley, 227 S.E.2d at 320-23. 
71. Green, 470 S.W.2d at 573 (quoting Rush, 217 A.2d at 446); Oakley, 227 S.E.2d at 323. A 
Missouri court found the legislative response less than satisfactory and established its own tem· 
porary guidelines for supplying counsel, which included a failsafe provision to discharge the 
accused unable to secure counsel. State ex rel Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981) (en 
bane). 
72. The courts held that the bar alone should not shoulder the burden. Green, 470 S.W.2d at 
573 (quoting Rush, 217 A.2d at 446). 
73. See, e.g., Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1043 (1987); Postma v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 439 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
918 (1989). The underlying logic is appealing as the attorney's claim for excess compensation is 
itself proof that the maximum had no deleterious effect on the defense. The syllogism thus cre-
ated is not easily broken. To do so would require counsel diligent enough to preserve the com-
pensation issue for appeal, but inattentive enough to not render effective assistance. 
74. Rush, 217 A.2d at 444; Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1110. 
75. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text. The effect of undercompensation, often 
errors of omission, may not be easily identifiable on the trial record. Suzanne E. Mounts, The 
Right to Counsel and the Indigent Defense System, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 221, 222 
(1986); Victoria R. Kendrick, Note, Uncompensated Appointments of Attorneys for Indigent 
Criminal Defense: The Need/or Supreme Court Standards, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 389, 401 (1984). 
76. Although the courts of at least two states have found prospective relief unavailable, Peo-
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With the exception of Rush, courts have shied away from a broad 
assessment of the adequacy of indigent representation provided by un-
dercompensated counsel and have resorted to ad hoc review. Most 
have found that the obligation to provide counsel may be satisfied by 
invoking the attorney's professional and ethical obligations. Relief is 
sparingly rationed on the basis of fairness to the attorney, with little 
attention to the operative realities for indigent representation. The re-
mainder of this Note assesses the cost of adequate representation in 
capital cases and argues that maximum fees make no more than a 
nominal contribution toward such defenses. The Note will argue fur-
ther that the burden of representation in capital cases properly rests 
with the state and not with individual members of the defense bar. 
II. THE EFFECT OF FEE LIMITATIONS ON REPRESENTATION: 
AN EVALUATION 
In Strickland v. Washington, 77 the Supreme Court created a two-
tiered standard for measuring challenges of ineffective assistance. To 
prevail on postconviction appeal, a defendant must rebut the presump-
tion that defense counsel's performance met an objective standard of 
reasonableness, 78 and then must show a reasonable probability that 
counsel's error prejudiced the outcome. 79 In a companion case, 
United States v. Cronic, 80 the Court reserved an exception to the pre-
sumption of competence, under circumstances where "the likelihood 
that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective 
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate 
without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial."81 
The recognition of a per se violation assumes special import with 
regard to fee limitations because of the heavy presumption that coun-
sel's actions lie within "sound trial strategy."82 Fee limitations, as dis-
cussed below, inhibit the momentum of the defense by discouraging or 
pie v. District Court of El Paso County, 761 P.2d 206 (Colo. 1988), Resek v. State 715 P.2d 1188 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986), the Eleventh Circuit held that prospective relief from a constitutionally 
infirm system of indigent representation may be had without a showing of inevitable prejudice. 
Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). But see Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144 
(6th Cir. 1990) (abstention warranted on civil rights claims pending state criminal prosecution). 
Some commentators have suggested that this is the most promising ~cute to challenge systemic 
defects as causation may not be easily unearthed in ad hoc review. Mounts, supra note 75, at 
223; Wilson, supra note 53, at 203. 
77. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
78. 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
79. 466 U.S. at 694. The Eleventh Circuit has held Strickland's prejudice requirement inap-
plicable to civil suits for prospective relief under the Sixth Amendment: "[D]eficiencies that do 
not meet the ineffectiveness standard may nonetheless violate a defendant's rights under the sixth 
amendment." Luckey v. Harris, 860 E.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988). 
80. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
81. 466 U.S. at 659-60. 
82. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The Court itself has acknowledged that "Strickland's stan-
dard, although by no means insurmountable, is highly demanding." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
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preventing the necessary effort. 83 Counsel may err by omission, and 
the underlying reason for omission will likely elude the trial record. 84 
A reviewing court then can easily characterize counsel's omissions as 
those of a calculated, strategic choice rather than the product of finan-
cial constraint and disincentive. 85 Moreover, counsel's strategic 
choice not to pursue certain lines of investigation and theories of de-
fense is often based on the financial constraints under which they oper-
ate. 86 Strickland presumes an adequate system with the possibility of 
individual failures; inadequate compensation and fee maxima under-
mine this assumption. Because the precise effect of fee limitations can 
rarely be proved, fee limitations can undergo meaningful Sixth 
Amendment review only if the system for providing indigent represen-
tation is reviewed wholesale, rather than attempting to detect its elu-
sive effects in ad hoc review.87 The Supreme Court recognized, 
somewhat unsympathetically, "the harsh reality that the quality of a 
criminal defendant's representation frequently may tum on his ability 
to retain the best counsel money can buy."88 More recently, the Court 
noted that under the appointed counsel system "the quality of repre-
sentation may improve when rates are increased."89 The argument 
against fee limitations relies on two related premises:90 that inade-
477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986); see also Goodpaster, supra note 39, at 66 (noting the failure of the 
Strickland test to address systemic impediments to the right to counsel). 
83. AMERICAN BAR AssN., GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 81 (1989). 
84. Goodpaster, supra note 40, at 355; Mounts, supra note 75, at 222-23. 
85. See, e.g., Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1989) (counsel's 29-word 
penalty phase presentation to the effect that "You've got that man's life in your hands. You can 
take it or not" might well "have been seen as a brilliant move"), cert. denied sub nom. Romero v. 
Collins, 494 U.S. 1012 (1990); Gilliard v. Scroggy, 847 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(pleading capital defendant guilty presumed to be a strategic choice), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 
(1989); Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 969-70 (11th Cir. 1983) (counsel's failure to present miti-
gating evidence at sentencing phase presumed to be a strategic choice). 
86. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. RBV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 137, 138 (1986). See, e.g., Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1254 (5th 
Cir. Unit B 1982) (measuring reasonableness of investigation relative to the available resources), 
revd. on other grounds, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
87. The right to effective representation at trial assumes additional consequence because of 
the narrowing scope of habeas review and the restricted availability of counsel. Bazelon, Defec-
tive Assistance, supra note 33, at 27. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). 
88. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (quoting Morris 
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result)). The Court added in the 
margin that "we cannot say that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel is a guarantee of a privately retained counsel in every complex case, irrespective of a 
defendant's ability to pay." 491 U.S. at 630 n.7. 
89. FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 110 S. Ct. 768, 775 (1990). 
90. This Note adopts separate analyses for these intertwined propositions because of the dif-
ference in their operation. Financial constraints affect the ability of counsel to render effective 
representation; courts, therefore, have been more receptive to arguments premised on inability of 
counsel. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. Financial disincentives operate to re-
duce the willingness of the attorney to provide effective representation and therefore fly in the 
face of the presumption of competence. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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quate compensation places a financial burden on appointed counsel 
that impairs their ability to render effective representation,9I and that 
inadequate compensation creates motivational disincentives to vigor-
ous representation.92 
To support the argument that fee limitations deprive indigent de-
fendants of counsel with the ability and incentive to provide effective 
representation, section II.A surveys several empirical assessments of 
the indigent defense system. Section II.B then analyzes the manner in 
which fee limitations impact criminal defense efforts. Section II.C re-
views the time-intensive requirements of a capital defense and com-
pares them to the maximum fee available. 
A. Empirical Assessments of the Appointed Counsel System 
Over the past quarter century, several studies have attempted to 
evaluate the provision of defense services to indigent criminal defend-
ants. 93 Although the survey methods and scope varied,94 all have con-
cluded that adequate compensation of assigned counsel is essential to 
effective representation of the poor.95 
91. As Justice Blackmun noted, "Appointed counsel may be inexperienced and undercom-
pensated and, for that reason, may not have adequate opportunity or resources to deal with the 
special problems presented by what is likely to be a complex trial." Caplin & Drysdale, 
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 649 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See REGINALD 
H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 113 (mem. ed. 1967); Goodpaster, supra note 39, at 75. 
92. One study found that "[ w ]here the structure of the fee schedule is so rigid as to not allow 
for the extra effort that a particular case might require ... [it] subtly tends to discourage expendi-
ture of that extra effort, even among the most conscientious of counsel." GUIDELINES FOR 
LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 274; see also Bill Deatherage, Comment, Uncom-
pensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgressfon, 60 KY. L.J. 710, 
711, 721 (1972); Sarah Grace Venable & Stephen Wells, Note, Providing Counsel for the Indigent 
Accused: The Criminal Justice Act, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 789, 801, 803 (1975); Kendrick, supra 
note 75, at 408. 
93. See CARLA K. GASKINS, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS: A NATIONAL SURVEY (1984); 
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 18; KRANTZ et al., supra note 11; NOR-
MAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS 
FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING (1982); 
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER AssOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE: A RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENDER SURVEY (1973) [hereinafter NATIONAL LEGAL Am]; SIL-
VERSTEIN, supra note 54; SPANGENBERG et al., supra note 14. 
94. The surveys based their conclusions on evaluations solicited from judges, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys; some included site visits and docket studies. The older studies often focus on 
uncompensated, rather than undercompensated, counsel. For purposes of financial burden and 
motivational implications, the distinction between nominal compensation and no compensation 
is assumed to be insignificant. The studies also differ in scope because of the Court's incremental 
expansion of the right to counsel, dramatically increasing the demand for defense services be-
tween the various studies. SPANGENBERG et al., supra note 14, at 1-2. 
95. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 54, at 148; NATIONAL LEGAL AID, supra note 93, at 53, 77; 
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 142, 263, 271, 275; KRANTZ et 
al., supra note 11, at 5, 243; LEFSTEIN, supra note 93, at 11, 19, 25; NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMN. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE 
COURTS 60 (1973); see also Richard Klein, Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Prom-
ise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 
(1986). Two related reports sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics made no assessment of 
640 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:626 
The first effort to evaluate systems of indigent representation was 
the American Bar Foundation's Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases 
in American State Courts, a two-year comprehensive study immedi-
ately on the heels of Gideon. 96 Amid the wide variation in functioning 
and effectiveness of defense systems,97 the study found few attorneys 
competent to practice in criminal court,98 and most of those who did 
practice received modest, if any, compensation.99 As to effectiveness, 
the study noted that indigent defendants pled guilty more often 100 and 
were more likely to be sentenced to prison than defendants with pri-
vately retained counsel.101 Counsel found appointments to be a bur-
densome obligation entailing personal sacrifice, 102 and many believed 
the system treated the indigent unfairly. 103 The study concluded that 
indigent defense systems faced "serious problems of financing" and 
required increased funding and training to attract able and competent 
attorneys to the defense bar.104 
Nearly a decade later, the National Defender Survey attempted a 
comprehensive national assessment of indigent defense services and 
published its report The Other Face of Justice. 105 The survey found 
that in a substantial number of jurisdictions, indigents received little 
more than pro forma representation.106 One of the report's authors 
concluded, "the resources allocated to indigent defense services are 
grossly deficient in light of the needs of adequate and effective repre-
sentation. "107 Although the recommendations favored state-funded 
public defender organizations, the survey identified adequate compen-
sation of appointed counsel and insulation of attorneys from extrinsic 
financial pressures as essential to effective representation.108 
In 1979, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
the adequacy of compensation for assigned counsel. GASKINS, supra note 93; SPANGENBERG et 
al., supra note 14. 
96. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 54. 
97. Id. at 34-35. 
98. Id. at 19. 
99. Id. at 16. 
100. Id. at 21. The study qualifies the reliability of this finding due to the small sample size 
and methodological irregularities. Id. For a partial list of those reaching similar conclusions, see 
infra note 140. ' 
101. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 54, at 25. The study's author declined to make any conclusion 
as to the causal link between appointed counsel and the increased incidence of guilty pleas and 
prison sentences. Id. 
102. Id. at 16-17, 32-33, 253-67. 
103. Id. at 33-34. 
104. Id. at 147-48. 
105. NATIONAL LEGAL Am, supra note 93. For a discussion of the methodological short· 
comings of the survey, see SPANGENBERG et al., supra note 14, at 1-2. 
106. NATIONAL LEGAL Am, supra note 93, at 77. 
107. Benner, supra note 35, at 685. 
108. NATIONAL LEGAL AID, supra note 93, at 77. 
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Defendants conducted a study, Criminal Defense Services for the 
Poor, 109 to assess defense services provided by state and local govern-
ments. The survey gave the most direct and critical treatment of rep-
resentation afforded by undercompensated, appointed counsel. As did 
its predecessors, the study found that grossly inadequate funding com-
promised the indigent's right to counsel, denying "millions of persons" 
effective legal representation.110 With respect to appointed counsel, 
the study found adequate compensation indispensable, but seriously 
lacking. 111 Without adequate funding, competent defense attorneys 
would refuse to accept appointments or would shirk the additional ef-
fort necessary to provide an effective defense.112 
Two government-appointed research teams, the Allen Commission 
and a Presidential Task Force, reached substantially similar conclu-
sions on the necessity of adequate compensation.113 . The former found 
that attempts "to meet the needs of the financially incapacitated ac-
cused through primary or exclusive reliance on the uncompensated 
services of counsel will prove unsuccessful and inadequate."114 The 
Task Force found that the "criminal process is seriously disabled by 
procedures which rely upon uncompensated or inadequately paid as-
signed counsel .... "m Although differing on the necessary level of 
compensation, 116 both groups saw inadequate compensation as a 
threat to the constitutional rights of the indigent accused. 
Thus, the major empirical studies unanimously have concluded 
that inadequate funding stands as the most prominent barrier to the 
provision of effective assistance of counsel.117 The judges under whom 
appointed counsel serve share in this criticism of the appointed coun-
sel system. 118 Judge Thomas J. MacBride, Chairman of the Judicial 
109. LEFSTEIN, supra note 93. 
110. Dean Lefstein prefaced his report by stating that "[o]verall, there is abundant evidence 
in this report that defense services for the poor are inadequately funded. As a result, millions of 
persons in the United States who have a constitutional right to counsel are denied effective legal 
representation." Id. at 2. 
111. Id. at 17. 
112. Id. at 11, 19-20, 39, 41, 54, 56. 
113. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 35, at 48-49; THE TASK FORCE ON THE 
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CoURTS 6P-61 (1967) [hereinafter THE 
COURTS). 
114. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 35, at 48. The Allen Commission did not 
recommend that fees for appointed counsel be commensurate with those commanded in private 
practice, but did suggest that fees should be reasonably adequate. Id. at 49. 
115. THE COURTS, supra note 113, at 60. The Task Force concluded that "[a]ssigned coun-
sel should be paid a fee comparable to that which an average lawyer would receive from a paying 
client for performing similar services." Id. at 61. 
116. See supra notes 114-15. 
117. Numerous local studies have reached similar conclusions. See Klein, supra note 95, at 
658-59 nn.189 & 191. 
118. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, supra note 23, at 2.32-39 (letters from federal 
judges criticizing compensation provisions); Greene, supra note 33, at 784 n.14 (Resolution of the 
Board of Judges finding that uncompensated counsel provided inadequate representation). 
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Conference Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act, 119 tes-
tified on behalf of the Judicial Conference that the current "per case 
maximums present an immediate threat" to the indigent accused's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel 120 and that inadequate compensa-
tion encourages attorneys to "cut corners," thereby depriving indi-
gents of their constitutional rights. 121 In accord, Judge David Bazelon 
observed that most indigents are denied effective representation 122 be-
cause of the overwork and indifference resulting from inadequate fee 
structures:123 "Courts simply do not pay appointed counsel enough 
... to enable them to perform effectively the myriad of tasks required 
of them."124 
B. The Effect of Inadequate Compensation on Appointed Counsel 
As previously mentioned, the failure to provide adequate compen-
sation lowers the quality of indigent representation in two important 
respects. It places financial burdens on the attorney that limit the abil-
ity to render effective representation. The attorney must choose be-
tween the ethical obligation of zealous representation 125 and personal 
financial hardship.126 Inadequate compensation also reduces the fi-
nancial incentives to accept appointed cases, and once appointed, to 
vigorously represent the indigent defendant. As King Lear scolded 
the fool for giving him nothing, the fool retorted " 'tis like the breath 
of an unfee'd lawyer, you gave me nothing for 't."127 
119. The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988), is the federal analogue of state 
compensation statutes. Its provisions are more generous than those of most states. See supra 
note 23. 
120. Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, supra note 23, at 24 (statement of Judge Thomas J. 
MacBride, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice 
Act). 
121. Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1985: Hearing on H.R. 3004 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1985) [hereinafter Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1985: Hearing] 
(statement of Judge Thomas J. MacBride). 
122. Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 33, at 2. 
123. Bazelon, Realities, supra note 33, at 813, 818, 835. 
124. Id. at 813. Judge Bazelon noted that statutory limitations on payments seriously un-
dercompensate an attorney appointed to a difficult defense. Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra 
note 33, at 9. 
125. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). Inadequate com-
pensation demands that attorneys disregard the approved standards of representation. LEF-
STEJN, supra note 93, at 57. 
126. See Newton R. Bradley, Representation of the Indigent Accused of Crime from the View-
point of Court Appointed Counsel, 29 Mo. L. REV. 328, 336 (1964). The Model Rules resolve this 
dilemma by allowing an attorney to withdraw from representation that would involve an unrea-
sonable financial burden. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2(b) (1983). 
Whether courts will allow withdrawal on this ground is unclear. Cf Haggins v. State, 498 So. 2d 
953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (denying public defender's motion to withdraw because of inade-
quate resources). 
127. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, SC. 4, lines 142-43 (George L. Kittredge 
ed., Ginn. & Co. 1940). 
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The costs of inadequate compensation borne by appointed counsel 
are twofold. First, the attorney forgoes the income to be received in 
the ordinary course of private practice. In particularly complex and 
protracted litigation, lost income may reach a substantial portion of 
annual earnings. 128 Second, the attorney may incur substantial over-
head costs associated with legal practice that exceed the fee maxi-
mum.129 The attorney therefore loses money by accepting 
appointments, paying overhead expenses from personal funds. 130 At-
torneys may protect their own financial well-being at the expense of 
the client's right to effective counsel.131 
The appointed counsel system has been roundly criticized for its 
failure to attract qualified counsel and its reliance on younger, inexpe-
rienced attorneys to represent indigent defendants.132 Undercompen-
sation discourages seasoned attorneys from accepting appointments133 
and leaves the lion's share of appointed cases to be divided among 
either young attorneys eager to gain trial experience134 or incompetent 
128. See, e.g., GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 35, at 15 (attorney spent 650 hours, half of his 
annual billable hours, defending an indigent); People v. Randolph, 219 N.E.2d 337, 339-40 (Ill. 
1966) (although fees limited to $250 per defendant, attorneys invested $31,000 in time and ex-
penses during the first nine weeks of a murder trial); Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, supra note 
23, at 293 (statement of Lionel Barrett) (attorney invested three and one half months in ap-
pointed case). 
129. See GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 35, at 3, 6, 15; LEFSTEIN, supra note 93, at 20-23. 
The overhead associated with practicing law has been estimated at forty percent of revenue. 
LAW OFFICE EcoNOMlCS & MANAGEMENT MANUAL,§§ 27.01, 54.01 (1986); Criminal Justice 
Act: Hearings, supra note 23, at 22 (statement of Judge Thomas J. MacBride). 
130. Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, supra note 23, at 24 (statement of Judge Thomas J. 
MacBride). 
131. See, e.g., In re Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d 230, 231 (N.C. 1977) (appointed counsel refused to 
file a petition for certiorari on behalf of client convicted of a capital offense, stating he was "not 
an eleemosynary institution" and could not justify working "at a rate less than that received by a 
garage mechanic"); In re Dale, 247 S.E.2d 246, 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (appointed counsel 
failed to perfect an appeal for client convicted of a capital offense, "placing [his] priority on 
living" rather than on representing his client); State v. Pelfrey, 256 S.E.2d 438, 440 (W. Va. 
1979) (appointed counsel failed to move for mistrial solely because of personal economic motiva-
tion); see also Bazelon, Realities, supra note 33, at 813. 
132. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, supra note 23, at 25 (statement of Judge 
Thomas J. MacBride) ("[The] exodus of qualified counsel will •.. result in 'the nation's poor 
becoming the 'guinea pigs' of the young, inexperienced, or marginal lawyers.' "); ATIORNEY 
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 35, at 10; Bazelon, Realities, supra note 33; Bazelon, Defective 
Assistance, supra note 33; Burger, supra note 33, at 238; GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 35, at 15; 
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 139; Tom Wicker, Defending the 
Indigent in Capital Cases, 2 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 2 (1983). 
133. Justice Blackmun commented that "even the best-intentioned of attorneys may have no 
choice but to decline the task of representing defendants in cases for which they will not receive 
adequate compensation." Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 646 
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see AMERICAN BAR AssN., supra note 83, at 79-80. Fifty-six 
percent of the federal district judges surveyed found that inadequate compensation hindered their 
ability to secure experienced, competent counsel for indigents. Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, 
supra note 23, at 140 (Letter of Theodore J. Lidz); see also Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1985: 
Hearing. supra note 121, at 55-56 (statement of the Federal Public and Community Defenders). 
134. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 57 n.21 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in result) 
(Because of the low rate of compensation, "the majority of persons willing to accept appoint-
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attorneys aptly characterized as "walking violations of the sixth 
amendment."135 Young attorneys are hampered by their unfamiliarity 
with trial practice, criminal procedure, and the courts.136 The second 
category of appointed counsel, often referred to as "the regulars," 
maintain their practice on a high volume of appointed cases.137 Their 
financial success depends on disposing of cases with a minimal invest-
ment of time and effort.138 The indigent defendant therefore enters the 
criminal justice system disadvantaged by having inexperienced or in-
competent counsel. 
The handicap of inexperienced counsel is compounded by the dis-
incentives to vigorous representation inherent in the fee maximum. 139 
This disincentive manifests itself most strikingly in the propensity of 
appointed counsel to encourage their clients to plead guilty to avoid 
the expense oftrial. 140 More subtly, inadequate compensation contrib-
utes to attorneys' indifference and occasional resentment toward court 
appointments. 141 Although damaging to a client's defense, indiffer-
ence almost always will evade a judicial review of effective assist-
ance.142 In its more overt form, this indifference may include failure 
ments are the young and inexperienced."); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 54, at 15-16; NATIONAL 
LEGAL AID, supra note 93, at 44-45. 
135. Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 33, at 2. 
136. See id. at 12-13; GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 139. 
137. See, eg, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 110 S. Ct. 768, 771 (1990). 
138. Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 33, at 9. Service provided by regulars has been 
labeled second-class representation, bearing little resemblance to the services afforded paying 
clients. Penny J. White, A Noble Idea Whose Time Has Come, 18 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 223, 
258-62 (1989). 
139. See supra note 92. Appointed counsel "cut corners and they don't explore all the possi-
ble answers that could be given to an indigent defendant,'' depriving indigents of their constitu-
tional rights. Criminal Justice Act: Hearings. supra note 23, at 10, 25 (statement of Judge 
Thomas J. MacBride); Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1985: Hearing, supra note 121, at 17 
(statement of Judge Thomas J. MacBride). 
140. Justice Blackmun observed that "[t]acing a lengthy trial against a better armed adver-
sary, the temptation to recommend a guilty plea will be great." United States v. Monsanto, 491 
U.S. 600, 649 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213, 215 
(5th Cir. 1973) (counsel pied client guilty without investigation or informing client of legal conse-
quences, and admitted "that he follows a substantially different practice when representing fee 
clients rather than appointed clients"); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972) 
(appointed counsel pied defendant guilty without investigation, and admitted that he would have 
proceeded differently if paid to defend client); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra 
note 35, at 29-31; GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 35, at l; GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE 
SYSTEMS, supra note 18, at 264; KRANTZ et al., supra note 11, at 235; Albert W. Alschuler, 
Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 149, 150 (1986); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 
84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 33, at 11, 16; Bazelon, Reali-
ties, supra note 33, at 813; Benner, supra note 35, at 684; Goodpaster, supra note 39, at 72-73; 
Klein, supra note 95, at 672. 
141. Bazelon, Realities, supra note 33, at 818; Hunter, supra note 33, at 8; David L. Shapiro, 
The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 782, 789 (1980). 
142. See Mounts, supra note 75, at 222-23; Kendrlck, supra note 75, at 401. 
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to investigate adequately the facts and research the relevant law.143 
The damaging effect of the fee maximums can be illustrated most ef-
fectively against the backdrop of a capital case in which the necessary 
preparation is monumental and the attorney's skill is critical to the 
outcome. 
C. The Requirements of an Effective Capital Defense 
The defense of a capital case is perhaps the most technically diffi-
cult form of litigation known to the American legal system.144 The 
extraordinary stakes - the client's life - and the complexity of the 
case demand the highest order of zeal and competence.145 
The complexity of capital litigation owes to several factors peculiar 
to the imposition of the death penalty. Representation of a capital 
defendant requires extraordinary investigation and preparation.146 
The investigation underpinning a capital defense is estimated to be 
three to five times longer than that of a noncapital trial, sometimes 
spanning two years. 147 The attorney must fully investigate the circum-
stances of the crime and conduct a complete investigation of the de-
143. See AMERICAN BAR AssN., supra note 83, at 79-80 (36% of attorneys in a Massachu-
setts survey admitted that they omitted some appropriate defense activity because of inadequate 
compensation); Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 33, at 10; White, supra note 138, at 252; 
Criminal Justice Act: Hearings, supra note 23, at 77 (statement of Samuel Skinner). 
Compensation directly affects the amount of effort attorneys are willing to invest in cases. 
LEFSTEIN, supra note 93, at 19, 39, 41, 54; GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 35, at 6. 
144. Murray v. Giarratano, 491 U.S. l, 27-28 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See SOUTH-
ERN PRISONERS' DEFENSE CoMM., DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA 1 (1988) [here-
inafter DEFENDING A CAflTAL CASE IN ALABAMA] (citing as factors the need for extensive 
pretrial investigation and preparation, unique sentencing phase, and rapidly developing law); 
Barry Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 241-43 (3d 
ed. 1982); see also 1 CALIFORNIA ATIORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE & CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS AssN., CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL A-7 & n.l (1986) [here-
inafter CALIFORNIA DEFENSE MANUAL]; SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, TRIAL OF THE 
PENALTY PHASE 1 (1981) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE]. 
145. The Supreme Court has recognized that "extraordinary measures" are necessary to en-
sure the reliability of decisions in capital cases, owing to the exceptional and'irrevocable nature of 
the penalty. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982); Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
357 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280 (1976). , 
· As Justice Marshall has noted, "defense counsel will reasonably exhaust every possible means 
to save his client from execution." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due 
Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980). 
146. The preparation of a case requires hundreds of hours of fact investigation and legal 
research, scientific analysis of a large volume of evidence and 'evaluation of the defendant's social 
and mental history. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 7; see also 
GIDEON UNDONE, supra note 35, at 14 (remarks of Randall M. Dana) (estimating that trial 
preparation for a capital case averages eight hundred hours). The burden is so weighty that some 
have suggested that two attorneys alone cannot competently represent a capital defendant. DE-
FENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 7; see also TRIAL OF THE PENALTY 
PHASE, supra note· 144, at 4. 
147. Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking A Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death 
Penalty, 18 u.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1252 (1985). 
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fondant's entire life. 148 Often the only hope of victory is for a sentence 
less than death.149 The investigation for the penalty phase of the trial 
therefore must assume primary importance in the defense, shaping all 
strategic choices throughout the defense, rather than being relegated 
to an afterthought in the event of a guilty verdict. 150 An attorney 
must devote "extraordinary diligence" to become familiar with the life 
and character of the accused.151 
In addition to a thorough and complete grasp of the underlying 
facts, a capital defense attorney must be familiar with a vast, evolving 
body of law. As death penalty cases merit extraordinary constitu-
tional protection, 152 the boundaries on the conduct of capital cases un-
dergo constant revision.153 The defense attorney must be familiar with 
all cases decided by and pending in the Supreme Court and other fed-
eral courts.154 The capital case requires exceptional vigilance in rais-
ing and preserving "numerous important and highly technical death 
penalty issues ... with which [nonspecialists] have no familiarity."15S 
A related peculiarity of capital defense lies in the extensive and 
intricate use of pretrial motions. 156 A typical capital case requires ten 
148. The "consideration of the character and record of the individual offender [is] a constitu-
tionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). The requisite investigation may take several months and 
must follow the defendant wherever he spent his life. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALA-
BAMA, supra note 144, at 336; 1 CALIFORNIA DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 144, at B-62. 
TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 13-14. The investigation may include events 
over the past 20 to 40 years. Garey, supra note 147, at 1251. 
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 
Gardener v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Reviewing courts 
have been willing to find ineffectiveness where counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating 
evidence in the penalty phase. See, e.g., Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(failure to investigate defendant's background); Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(failure to investigate mental history). Some, however, have framed counsel's failure as a strate-
gic choice. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
149. See DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 334; TRIAL OF THE 
PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 1-2. 
150. TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 1-5. 
151. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 5. 
152. See supra note 145. 
153. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 1. "[T]his Court's 
death penalty jurisprudence unquestionably is difficult even for a trained lawyer to master." 
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. l, 28 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). One litigator commented, 
"No case I have ever handled compares in complexity with my Florida death penalty case. The 
death penalty jurisprudence is unintelligible; it is inconsistent and, at times, irrational." THE 
SPANGENBERG GROUP, A CASELOAD/WORKLOAD FORMULA FOR FLORIDA'S OFFICE OF THE 
CAPITAL COLLATERAL REPRESENTATIVE 12 (1987). 
154. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 1; see also Burger, supra 
note 33, at 233. 
155. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 3, 13-17. Due to the 
rapidly evolving nature of the law, no issues are frivolous and all must be preserved. "A losing 
issue today could be a winner tomorrow." Id. at 1. 
156. As noted by one study, "[m]otions create a record and set a course of strategy upon 
which the entire litigation effort in a capital case is patterned." NEW YORK STATE DEFENDERS 
AssN., CAPITAL LOSSES: THE PRICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YORK STATE 12 
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to twenty-five motions, each of which must be researched and litigated 
with greater care and thoroughness than in a noncapital defense.157 
Although some will bear similarity to routine criminal motion prac-
tice, such as a motion to suppress evidence, many will turn ·on the 
intricacies of the constitutional protections afforded capital defend-
ants.158 Not only must the defense file motions tailored to the specific 
defendant, it must raise objections to all the potential systemic defects 
of the capital punishment process.159 This includes challenges to the 
particular capital punishment statute, the method of selection and 
composition of the petit and grand juries, and the indictment proce-
dure.160 Also, a series of motions must be filed to protect the defend-
ant against prejudicial publicity161 and from the infection of jury bias 
during voir dire. 162 The defense must move to retain expert assi~tance, 
including investigators, forensic scientists, psychological and psychiat-
ric experts, and juristic psychologists.163 Each motion requires sub-
stantial investigation and research as well as litigation before the trial 
judge.164 The success of each motion may determine the outcome of 
the trial as well as establish a record on which higher courts may re-
view conviction and sentencing. 
The capital trial opens with procedural and substantive complexi-
ties well beyond those in traditional criminal defense cases. Jury selec-
tion criteria include a broader range of issues, and the selection 
process has been estimated to take 5.3 times longer than ordinary se-
(1982) [hereinafter CAPITAL LossES]; see also 1 CALIFORNIA DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 
144, at D-1 to D-9. 
157. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, MOTIONS FOR CAPITAL CASES 5-7 (Dennis N. 
Balske ed. 1981) [hereinafter MOTIONS FOR CAPITAL CASES]; see also 1 CALIFORNIA DEFENSE 
MANUAL, supra note 144, at A-3; Garey, supra note 147, at 1248. 
158. Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprison-
ment?: Some Cost Considerations, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 45, 50 (1989); see also THE SPANGEN-
BERG GROUP, supra note 153, at 10 ("Such motions are not only routine in capital cases but are 
also required for defense counsel to meet their ethical responsibilities."). 
159. See CAPITAL LossES, supra note 156, at 12-13. Because of the evolving constitutional 
protections, a defense attorney must take issue with and litigate any aspect of the capital proce-
dure that she believes unfair. See DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, 
at 10; Garey, supra note 147, at 1255. 
160. See 3 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 4 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL 
CASES§ 4 (1984); DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 86-91, 164-
71; MOTIONS FOR CAPITAL CASES, supra note 157, at 6. 
161. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 233-39; cf MOTIONS 
FOR CAPITAL CASES, supra note 157, at 5-7. 
162. 1 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES, §§ 3.01, 3.06[1) 
(2d ed. 1989); see also Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 
AKRON L. REV. 331, 341 (1979) (sequestered voir dire is critical in a capital case). 
163. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes access to expert assistance, but defense 
counsel must establish the need for such assistance before a court is required to provide funds. 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980). See 
generally 1 AMSTERDAM, supra note 160, at§ 299. 
164. CAPITAL LOSSES, supra note 156, at 12-13. 
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lection, sometimes lasting up to two months. 165 On voir dire, potential 
jurors must be examined individually to identify any prejudice that 
may have arisen from the pretrial publicity common to capital tri-
als. I66 Voir dire also includes the "death qualification" of the jurors, 
exploring their personal beliefs and ability to impose the death pen-
alty. I67 Defense attorneys must exercise special care in framing their 
inquiry, as voir dire can shape the jurors' attitudes toward the defend-
ant and their propensity to impose a death sentence. 168 Attorneys also 
must attempt to convince the trial judge to restrict the form of qualifi-
cation by demonstrating the prejudicial effects of death qualification 
procedures. I69 Selection can be further complicated and lengthened 
by state procedures requiring larger jury panels and the selection of 
two juries, one to determine guilt and another to recommend a 
sentence. I 7° 
The actual trial of a capital case takes on average 3.5 times longer 
than a noncapital murder case and lasts an average of thirty days. 171 
The trial alone consumes between 850 and 1000 hours of the attor-
ney's time.I72 The evidence usually involves a larger number of wit-
nesses and an increased use of expert testimony. 173 The issues to be 
heard are more complex and the procedural safeguards to be invoked 
are more rigorous. 174 Much of the additional time is due to the bifur-
cated proceedings in which a defendant found guilty is afforded a sepa-
rate trial to determine the propriety of a death sentence.175 
Unlike any other judicial proceeding, the penalty phase of a capital 
trial raises unique issues of strategy, evidence, and preparation.176 The 
165. Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 158, at 51-52; CALIFORNIA DEFENSE MANUAL, 
supra note 144, at E-7; Garey,· supra note 147, at 1257. 
166. CAPITAL LossES, supra note 156, at 16-17. 
167. Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 158, at 51. Once a prospective juror expresses oppo-
sition to the death penalty, the defense attorney must attempt to save her from challenge for 
cause by eliciting testimony that her beliefs will not interfere with the discharge of her jury 
duties. NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 162, at 10.03[8)[a][i]. 
168. Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death Quali-
fication Process, 8 l:AW & HuM. BEHAV. 121, 128 (1984); Craig Haney, Examining Death Quali· 
fication: Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133, 151 (1984); see also 
NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 162, at§ 3.03[3)[c]; EMILY DE FALLA ET AL., CAPITAL 
TRIALS: JUROR ATTITUDES AND SELECTION STRATEGIES i (1984). 
169. NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 162, at § 3.01. Success at trial on this issue is 
critical due to the unwillingness of higher courts to review for bias infused during the death 
qualification process. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
170. Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 158 at 51-52; Garey, supra note 147, at 1256. 
171. Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 158, at 53; Garey, supra note 147, at 1258. 
172. Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 158, at 53. 
173. Garey, supra note 147, at 1252, 1258-59. See CAPITAL LOSSES, supra note 156, at 13-
18; AMERICAN BAR AssN., supra note 83. 
174. See Nakell, supra note 144, at 242-43. 
175. See Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 158, at 52. 
176. TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 1. See generally Dennis N. Balske, 
The Penalty-Phase Trial, in 2 CALIFORNIA DEFENSE MANUAL, supra note 144, at H-6 to H-13. 
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rules of evidence are relaxed 177 and the scope of relevant inquiry is 
dramatically expanded. 178 The defense assumes an affirmative role,179 
trying to convince the jury that the defendant deserves to live. 
Although strategies must be tailored to the particular defendant, two 
basic tactics usually surface: humanizing the defendant and present-
ing a general case against execution.180 Humanizing the client re-
quires research into personal history from birth to trial, interviewing 
family, neighbors, teachers, ministers, employers and anyone with sig-
nificant contact with the defendant. 181 These witnesses must be 
presented to the jury to tell the defendant's story, to make sense of the 
client's life and to explain how he came to commit the crime.182 Law 
enforcement officers, witnesses to executions, ministers and experts on 
the deterrent effect all may be used to pose an attack on the penalty 
itself, to convince the jury that its imposition is improper. 183 The pen-
alty phase is another complete trial, often of superior importance given 
the frequently overwhelming evidence of guilt. 184 It requires attention 
to the entire life of a defendant and allows the defense to take the 
offensive. The task of arguing for life is monumental. 
In summary, representing a defendant against the possibility of 
death raises problems unknown to traditional criminal defense prac-
tice. The factual inquiry and the necessary legal preparation are enor-
mous. Trial preparation requires hundreds of hours of research and 
investigation over several months. 185 The trial alone can monopolize 
the attorney's practice for an entire month. One admittedly modest 
estimate placed the attorney cost for a capital defense at $106,350.186 
A statutory fee provision that allows for fifty hours of representation 
provides little more than a token contribution to an adequate defense. 
The preceding analysis can place no firm dollar figure on capital litiga-
tion, 187 nor does it exhaustively detail the necessary elements of an 
177. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979). 
178. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976). 
179. Goodpaster, supra note 40, at 335. 
180. TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 11-21. 
181. 3 AMSTERDAM, supra note 160, at§ 468-A(F). 
182. TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 13-16; DE FALLA et al., supra note 
168, at 7. · 
183. TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 16-21. 
184. DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN ALABAMA, supra note 144, at 334; see TRIAL OF THE 
PENALTY PHASE, supra note 144, at 1. 
185. See supra note 128. Effective representation requires more extensive preparation than 
the average appointed counsel can afford to provide. Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the 
Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1434 (1965). 
186. CAPITAL LOSSES, supra note 156, at 18 & n.48; see also Garey, supra note 147, at 1258, 
1261; Spangenberg & Walsh, supra note 158, at 53. 
187. Indeed, arriving at an estimate for the cost of effective representation would prove diffi-
cult. Since most appointed counsel and public defenders operate under severe financial con-
straints, the time they would invest in effective representation of capital defendants could be 
discerned only if those constraints were lifted. 
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effective capital defense. This brief sketch of capital litigation, how-
ever, demonstrates that fee maxima, by any reasonable estimate, exac-
erbate the problems inherent in already inadequate fee schedules. To 
ask attorneys to invest one thousand hours of billable time for which 
they will receive no more than one thousand dollars cannot but endan-
ger the client's right to effective representation. 
III. CONFUSING THE ATTORNEY'S AND THE STATE'S 
OBLIGATIONS 
Courts rejecting constitutional challenges to undercompensated 
appointments place great emphasis on the attorneys' duty as officers of 
the court and their ethical obligation to perform pro bono public ser-
vice. Under this reasoning, the state owes the defendant meaningful 
access to counsel, 188 and attorneys must serve at the direction of the 
court. 189 Courts may therefore direct attorneys to fulfill the state's 
obligation to indigent defendants. 190 Although admitting the in-
dependent force of these obligations, 191 this Part argues that pig-
gybacking these duties is improper, misplacing the burden of indigent 
defense on the private practitioner192 and losing sight of the primary 
concern of effective representation. 193 This Part acknowledges that at-
188. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963). 
189. The Supreme Court held that "[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to 
render service when required by such an appointment." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 
(1932). 
190. On the relationship of the attorney's obligation and the defendant's right to counsel, 
Justice White commented: "I discern nothing in the Sixth Amendment that would prohibit a 
State from requiring its lawyers to represent indigent criminal defendants without any compensa· 
tion for their services at all." Martin County v. Makemson, 479 U.S. 1043, 1045 (1987) (White, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Courts regularly have followed the logic that the attor· 
ney's duty to the court and to the public satisfies the state's obligation to provide counsel to 
indigent defendants. See, e.g., Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1982); 
Unites States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 532 
(Ala. 1979); Resek v. State, 715 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); State v. Allen, 611 P.2d 
605, 608 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). 
191. The pro bono obligation derives from the attorney's oath on admission to the bar and 
the ethical obligations ascribed to the bar. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 2.48.210 (West 
1988); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROPES· 
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980). 
An attorney's obligation to the court derives from the court's inherent power to regulate its 
participants. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 73 ("The duty of the trial court to appoint 
counsel under such circumstances is clear, ... and its power to do so, even in the absence of a 
statute, cannot be questioned."); Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 312-13 
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A] court's power to require a lawyer to render assistance to the 
indigent is firmly rooted in the authority to define the terms and conditions upon which members 
are admitted to the bar, and to exercise 'those powers necessary to protect the functioning of its 
own processes.'" (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 821 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)) (footnote and citations omitted)). 
192. See AMERICAN BAR AssN., supra note 83, at 79-80. 
193. See Wilson, supra note 53, at 206. If the analysis of the preceding section is accepted, 
the question of burden need not be reached because undercompensated attorneys are financially 
incapable of adequately representing the indigent defendant regardless of ethical commitment. 
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torneys can be compelled to serve at the behest of the court but con-
tends that the state, and not the private bar, should bear the cost of 
such service. The cost of indigent representation is a price of the effi-
cient functioning of the criminal justice system,194 a cost properly 
borne by the society that created it and benefits from it. 195 Section 
III.A traces the sources of the professional obligations upon which 
courts placed the burden of representing indigents. Section III.B then 
turns to the question of who should bear the cost of the Gideon 
mandate. 
A. The Legal Force of the Professional and Ethical Obligations 
The Supreme Court has yet to reach the question whether courts 
may require attorneys to serve without compensation.196 The Court, 
however, endorsed recent scholarship casting doubt on the historical 
foundations of coerced representation197 and noted the "complete ab-
sence of precedent evincing state courts' power to sanction attorneys 
unwilling to provide free representation."198 Nevertheless, substantial 
case law acknowledges the duty to accept unpaid appointments as a 
concomitant element of membership in the bar.199 Traditional legal 
Should courts properly be able to shift the burden of indigent representation, the invocation of 
the bar's obligation does not absolve the state of its obligation to provide counsel where the bar 
fails to meet its responsibility. 
194. SPANGENBERG et al., supra note 14, at 1; Shapiro, supra note 141, at 780. A Presiden-
tial Task Force found that "[t]he criminal process is seriously disabled by procedures which rely 
upon uncompensated or inadequately paid assigned counsel." THE COURTS, supra note 113, at 
60. 
195. "Government has the responsibility to provide adequate funding for legal representation 
of all eligible persons .... " AMERICAN BAR AssN., ST AND ARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5-1.5 
(1980); see also EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 241 (1951) (crimi-
nal defense is clearly a public function); LEFSTEIN, supra note 93, at 59 ("Adequate funding of 
defense programs is an unavoidable obligation."); THE COURTS, supra note 113, at 61 (rejecting 
reliance on an ethical obligation); Charles Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of 
the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (indigent representation is society's 
obligation). 
196. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308 n.8 (1989). Dicta in Mallard 
suggests that the Court might find a professional obligation of indigent defense for attorneys as 
officers of the court. The four dissenters grounded their argument on such a duty. 490 U.S. at 
312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Kennedy qualified his opinion with a recog-
nition of attorneys' "obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of the court." 490 U.S. 
at 310-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 110 S. 
Ct. 768, 791 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (The attorney's 
"duty to serve the public by representing indigent defendants is not only a matter of conscience, 
but is also enforceable by the government's power to order such representation, either as a condi-
tion of practicing law ... or on pain of contempt."). 
197. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 304 ("To justify coerced, uncompensated legal services on the basis 
of a firm tradition in England and the United States is to read into that tradition a story that is 
not there.") (citing Shapiro, supra note 141, at 753). 
198. 490 U.S. at 304 n.4. 
199. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 
(1966). Then-Judge Cardozo proclaimed for the New York Court of Appeals: "'Membership in 
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.' The appellant was received into that ancient 
fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like the 
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scholarship followed similar reasoning in divining a professional duty 
to accept appointments absent compensation.200 The duty can be at-
tributed either to the inherent power of the court to direct its of-
ficers201 or to a condition of entry into a state-created monopoly over 
which the courts have ultimate control.202 
Whether an inherent power of the court or an incident of licensure 
to practice law, the rationale for compelled service is the maintenance 
of the integrity of the legal system. Without power to compel the ser-
vice of attorneys, the wheels of justice might grind to a halt as courts 
unable to honor a defendant's right to counsel could not proceed 
against him. 203 Compelled service allows courts a stopgap measure to 
continue functioning when the state fails to meet its obligation to pro-
vide indigent defense. 204 However unavoidable the occasional uncom-
pensated appointment may be, the attorney's obligation does not 
encompass a complete assumption of the state's obligation to the indi-
gent defendant. The difference is a critical one. An occasional un-
compensated appbintment may pose only a small and infrequent 
burden on the attorney and do little to shape the expectations of the 
bar toward appointments. The regular, wholesale shifting of the 
state's burden of representation onto the bar may do great violence to 
the attorney's ethical commitment and willingness to render zealous 
representation without compensation. 
The courts' references to the attorney's obligation to perform pro 
bono service stand on tenuous footing. The American Bar Associa-
tion's ethical guidelines establish an aspirational goal for attorneys to 
render pro bono service, but provide no requirements of such.205 The 
ABA expressly rejected a proposal that would require attorneys to 
provide forty hours pro bona service annually.206 Even if the bar were 
to adopt a mandatory requirement, it surely would not approach the 
court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." People ex rel. Karlin v. 
Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928). 
But see Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16-17 (1854), quoted in Shapiro, supra note 141, at 761-62 
(The legal profession has been "properly stripped of all its odious distinctions and peculiar emol-
uments."). Accord DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 440-42 (Alaska 1987). 
200. Professor Cooley's treatise is often cited for this proposition. THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
CONSflTUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 334 (3d ed. 1974). 
Reginald Heber Smith also identified a legal obligation to represent the poor without compen-
sation grounded in English history. SMITH, supra note 91, at 247-49. The Supreme Court has 
characterized such descriptions of this obligation as "unqualified and poorly documented asser-
tions of its existence .... " Mallard, 490 U.S. 304 n.4. 
201. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
202. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 286 (1988). . 
203. See infra note 218. 
204. The primary scholarship on compulsory service identifies the attorney as a failsafe pro· 
tection when the state fails its obligation. See supra note 200. 
205. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO• 
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1982); see also LUBAN, supra note 20::?, at 277-78. 
206. Shapiro, supra note 141, at 736-38. 
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thousand or more hours of attorney time regularly conscripted in 
court appointments to a capital defense. Seizing a substantial portion 
of an attorney's productive hours under the aegis of public service is 
beyond the wildest dreams of even the most impassioned advocates of 
pro bono service. 201 
Furthermore, the ABA rejected the position that attorneys can be 
compelled to supply pro bona services in criminal cases.208 Few attor-
neys are qualified to try criminal cases;209 still fewer are competent to 
mount a capital defense.21° Compelled criminal pro bono service 
would either conscript unqualified counsel or impose an overwhelming 
burden on a small segment of the bar.211 The attorneys qualified to 
represent capital defendants at trial largely belong to small firms or are 
sole practitioners,212 and are therefore incapable of spreading the cost 
among many attorneys in a large office. Essential to the notion of pub-
lic service is that pro bona work is given by the attorney, not compelled 
by the court on pain of sanction. Compulsion would strip pro bono 
service of its charitable character and oblige the attorney to the court's 
choice of service. Were the bar to adopt a mandatory pro bono re-
quirement, it nevertheless would be inappropriate for the court to de-
termine how and for whom each attorney's public service should be 
rendered.213 Most attorneys view pro bona representation as a chari-
table contribution of legal services; the attorney should be able to de-
termine to whom and in what form that donation will be made. 
Neither duty nor ethics justify the imposition on members of the bar of 
what is, at bottom, the state's obligation to the indigent defendant. 
B. The State's Obligation to the Indigent Defendant 
The state, not the bar, ultimately owes the criminally accused 
meaningful assistance of counsel. The accused's Sixth Amendment 
right is guaranteed against any judgment the state might win in viola-
tion of that right. Thus, the usual remedy for failure to provide effec-
tive assistance is the reversal of a conviction prosecuted in the state's, 
not the bar's, interest. Effective defense counsel not only benefit the 
state by allowing the successful prosecution of criminals, but also by 
207. See id. 
208. AMERICAN BAR AssN. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5.2(a), commentary at 
47-48 (Approved Draft 1968) (quoting POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, Standard 4.4(a) (Tenta-
tive Draft 1967)); see also Wilson, supra note 53, at 206-07. 
209. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 54, at 19; LEFSTEIN, supra note 93, at 18. 
210. See supra section 11.C. 
211. LEFSTEIN, supra note 93, at 18; Hunter, supra note 33, at 10-11. 
212. See supra note 54. 
213. ROSCOE POUND, AM. TRIAL LAWYERS FOUND., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF 
CONDUCT ch. VIII, cmt. (1982). 
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safeguarding constitutional protections that benefit every member of 
the society. 
The fundamental character of the right to counsel depends largely 
on the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system.214 The prose-
cution brings to bear the vast resources of the state to try a criminal 
defendant.215 The accused must be allowed the opportunity to subject 
the prosecution's case to "the crucible of meaningful adversarial test-
ing."216 In its appeal for the adequate compensation of appointed 
counsel, the Allen Commission suggested: 
[N]o one would be likely to urge that the government's interest in effec-
tive prosecution of criminal cases can be adequately advanced by dele-
gating the prosecuting function to lawyers who receive no compensation 
for their services . . . . Yet the proper functioning of the adversary sys-
tem of justice, in which the nation as a whole has an important stake, 
demands that the defense of accused persons proceed at a level of zeal 
and effectiveness equivalent to that manifested in their prosecution. The 
notion that the defense of accused persons can fairly or safely be left to 
uncompensated attorneys reveals the fundamental misconception that 
the representation of financially deprived defendants is essentially a char-
itable concern. On the contrary, it is a public concern of high importance. 
A system of adequate representation, therefore, should be structured and 
financed in a manner reflecting its public importance.217 
The defense of the indigent accused is an essential element of the ad-
versarial system, without which the prosecution cannot properly pro-
ceed.218 The state benefits from the defense of the indigent accused 
through the protection of its constitutional principles219 and in the le-
214. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655·56 (1984); United States v. Morrison, 
449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Lefstein, supra note 
39, at 12. 
215. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
216. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656; see White, supra note 138, at 237. 
217. ArroRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 35, at 48-49 (emphasis added); see also 
Benner, supra note 35, at 684 (appeal to charity cannot satisfy the constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel). 
218. The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the necessary expenses of a prosecution 
include "the expense of providing counsel for an indigent accused, without which a prosecution 
would halt and inevitably fail under Gideon v. Wainwright." State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 449 
(N.J. 1966). The Illinois court similarly found that, "[i]f such judicial power [to order excess 
compensation] did not exist, the courts probably could not proceed, and certainly could not 
conclude the trial of indigent defendants .•.. " People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 219 N.E.2d 
337, 340 (III. 1966). Likewise, a Kentucky court held that "the state either must see that the 
defendant is provided counsel or it cannot proceed with the prosecution." Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 
S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627, 631-32 (Ky. 
1970)). 
219. Adopting this rationale, the Supreme Court of Alaska held: 
Counsel is appointed not out of a desire to benefit any individual defendant, but to ensure 
that all defendants are treated equally before the law, that all defendants will receive a fair 
trial before an impartial tribunal. . . . Because the appointment thus benefits all persons 
equally, the cost of providing such representation must be equally borne rather than shunted 
to specific persons or specifically identified classes of persons. 
We thus conclude that requiring an attorney to represent an indigent criminal defendant 
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gitimate operation of its crimina1 justice system. 220 The state, there-
fore, should bear all the component costs of the system, just as it bears 
the costs of the judiciary and the prosecution.221 
Shifting the duty of indigent representation onto the yoke of the 
defense bar not only neglects the state's obligation, but also derogates 
the defendant's right to counsel. The state recognizes its responsibility 
to the justice system through the funding of the system's operations. 
It does not ask its police officers, prosecutors, or judges to perform 
their duties with nominal recompense. Nevertheless, only two percent 
of criminal justice spending goes to the defense of indigents, 222 a group 
comprising forty-eight percent of the criminally accused. 223 The result 
is a necessarily skewed social commitment in the adversaria1 system, 
emphasizing the interest of the state in conviction and minimizing the 
constitutiona1 rights of the accused. The adversaria1 process requires a 
balance of skill and resources to reach an equitable result. 224 By fund-
ing prosecutoria1 functions and relegating indigent defense to the ethi-
cal aspirations of the lega1 profession, the state has put its thumb on 
the scales of justice. The social commitment should be no less for pro-
tecting the rights of the accused than for convicting the guilty. 
Most troubling, the appea1 to the professiona1 and ethica1 obliga-
tions of the bar deflects attention from the accused's right to counsel 
to the attorney's duty to the court. 225 As reiterated throughout this 
analysis, the defendant's right to effective representation must remain 
at the fore, as the Sixth Amendment is satisfied by nothing less. 226 A 
system of indigent representation that deters and impedes effective 
representation cannot satisfy the constitutional requirement of counsel 
for only nominal compensation unfairly burdens the attorney by disproportionately placing 
the cost of a program intended to benefit the public upon the attorney rather than upon the 
citizenry as a whole. 
DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987) (citation omitted). In this 
vein, the Florida Supreme Court has held that "since the State of Florida enforces the death 
penalty, its primary obligation is to ensure that indigents are provided competent, effective coun-
sel in capital cases." White v. Board of County Commrs., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989). 
220. The state's interest in the representation of the poor draws from its interest in the legiti-
macy of its legal order. Without equal justice, the entire system forfeits its legitimacy for both 
the indigent and the wealthy. See LUBAN, supra note 202, at 286; Klein, supra note 95, at 682-
83. See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1291 (the 
appearance of effective representation for criminal defendants is important to public trust in the 
fairness of the entire legal system). 
221. AMERICAN BAR AssN., supra note 83, at 80; Lefstein, supra note 39, at 12. 
222. The justice system expenditures for fiscal year 1986 totalled $53,499,805,000 and ex-
penditures for indigent defense programs reached an estimated $991,047,250. U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
1988 at 136 (Katherine M. Jamieson & Timothy J. Flanagan, eds., 1989). 
223. SPANGENBERG et al., supra note 14, at 33. 
224. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 35, at 48. 
225. Wilson, supra note 53, at 206. 
226. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
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with mere reference to the lofty ideals ascribed to the profession.227 
In reconciling the state's obligation to provide indigent defense and 
the attorney's professional and ethical obligations, the Supreme Court 
of Florida placed an insightful gloss on Gideon: 
[A]fter Gideon, dual obligations arose regarding the representation of 
indigents in criminal cases: the constitutional obligation of the state cre-
ated under Gideon and the ethical obligation of the attorney that accom-
panies the profession. When an attorney is called upon by the state to 
represent an indigent defendant in a criminal case, not only is the attor-
ney expected to provide legal services as part of his or her professional 
ethical obligation, but the state, as part of its constitutional obligation, 
must reasonably compensate the attorney for those services.228 
The burden of providing representation to indigent defendants be-
longs to the society as a whole and cannot be carried by the defense 
bar alone. The bar may assume responsibility for the cases that slip 
through the cracks, but professional obligation and ethical aspiration 
should not provide a means to shift the state's obligation onto the bar. 
If we are to claim the benefits of a system that metes out justice with-
out regard to the wealth of the accused, we must pay the price for that 
system. A critical component, and therefore cost, of that system is the 
effective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment requires the state to provide effective repre-
sentation to the indigent accused. Although free to devise their own 
systems of indigent representation, states m~st ensure that their obli-
gation to the defendant is met. That obligation does not cease by 
merely pointing a finger at the attorney and reciting professional 
obligations. 
Capital defense is perhaps one of the most complex, weighty, and 
important obligations borne within our legal system. Yet the compen-
sation structure for appointed counsel makes only a token contribu-
tion to the defense of the capital accused. The defendant's right to 
counsel, therefore, falls to concerns of economy and the attorney's fi-
nancial self-interest. When the system of indigent representation fails, 
the state has failed to meet its obligation under Gideon. 
James Baldwin poignantly observed that "[t]he fate of [a criminal 
227. The American Bar Association has rejected the simple invocation of Sixth Amendment 
ideals as sufficient to satisfy its requirement: 
A general statement of high purpose alone will not suffice to ensure high quality representa-
tion. Attorney error is often the result of systemic problems, not individual deficiency. The 
provision of counsel for indigent capital defendants (where counsel is provided at all) often 
incorporates the worst features of the universally condemned ad hoc system for assigning 
counsel, which is at odds with the notion of quality representation. 
AMERICAN BAR AssN., supra note 83, at 35 (1989). See Lefstein, supra note 39, at 9. 
228. White v. Board of County Commrs., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989). 
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defendant] depends, to put it brutally, on [his] money: one may say, 
generally, that, if a poor man in trouble with the law receives justice, 
one can suppose heavenly intervention."229 A system of indigent rep-
resentation cannot rely on divine intervention to protect the rights of 
the criminally accused; it must recognize and conform to the economic 
realities of legal practice. Inevitably, a handful of committed and 
laudable attorneys will undertake personal sacrifice to provide effective 
representation to those unable to afford it, but the rights of the accused 
cannot be left to chance assignment. For the indigent defendant, fee 
limitations place an economic burden on appointed counsel and create 
strong disincentives to zealous representation. 
229. JAMES BALDWIN, No Name in the Street, in THE PRICE OF TllE TICKET: COLLECTED 
NONFICTION 1948-1985 at 524 (1985). 
